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1 
Freedom of Religion and Belief in India and Australia: 
An Introductory Comparative Assessment of Two 
Federal Constitutional Democracies 
 
Paul T. Babie* & Arvind P. Bhanu† 
 
Abstract 
 
This article considers the freedom of religion and belief (“free 
exercise”) in two secular federal constitutional democracies: 
India and Australia.  Both constitutional systems emerged from 
the former British Empire and both continue in membership of 
the Commonwealth of Nations, which succeeded it.  However, the 
similarities end there, for while both separate church and state, 
and protect free exercise, they do so in very different ways.  On the 
one hand, the Indian Constitution contains express provisions 
which comprehensively deal with free exercise.  On the other 
hand, while one finds what might appear a protection for free 
exercise in the Australian Constitution, that protection is far from 
comprehensive.  Instead, unlike its Indian counterpart, the 
Australian federal democracy depends upon a piecemeal 
collection of Constitutional, legislative, and common law 
provisions which, when taken together, seem to achieve plenary 
protection for free exercise.  Still, while India protects free exercise 
within a comprehensive constitutional framework, and while 
Australia does so in a disjointed and fragmentary way, both 
arrive at the same place: a constitutionalism characterized by 
secularism/separation of church and state combined with a 
corresponding comprehensive protection for free exercise. 
 
 
 
 
* Adelaide Law School Professor of the Theory and Law of Property, Adelaide 
Law School (ALS), The University of Adelaide, Australia. We are most grateful 
to Kyriaco Nikias (LLB, Adelaide, 2018), for outstanding research assistance 
with and insight into the content of this article, and to Nigel Williams for 
preparing Diagrams 1 & 2. 
† Professor of Law & Acting Director, Amity Law School, Delhi, India. 
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Introduction 
 
Freedom of religion and belief (“free exercise”) continues to 
attract international attention.  In case after case in various 
jurisdictions,1 appellate courts give shape and structure to this 
keystone right and its role in ensuring protection for the panoply 
of fundamental rights and freedoms.2  Justice Kennedy, in his 
very last opinion, delivered in the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Trump v. Hawaii, provides this eloquent summary: 
 
 
1.  See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2392 (2018); see also Law 
Soc’y of B.C. v. Trinity W. Univ., [2018] S.C.R. 32 (Can. B.C. S.C.C.); Trinity 
W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2018] S.C.R. 33 (Can. B.C. S.C.C.); 
Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Apr. 17, 2018, 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESARBEITSGERICHTS [BAGE] 257 (Ger.), translated 
in http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=201148& 
doclang=EN; In re N. Ir. Human Rights Comm’n for Judicial Review (2018) 
UKSC 27 (appeal taken from N. Ir.). 
2.  Keith Thompson, Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech: The 
United States, Australia and Singapore Compared, 6 GLOBAL SCI. & TECH. 
FORUM J.L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 2–4 (2017).  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1
ARTICLE 1_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/03/2019  7:54 PM 
2018 FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF  3 
The First Amendment prohibits the 
establishment of religion and promises the free 
exercise of religion.  From these safeguards, and 
from the guarantee of freedom of speech, it follows 
there is freedom of belief and expression.  It is an 
urgent necessity that officials adhere to these 
constitutional guarantees and mandates in all 
their actions . . .3 
 
When combined with the protection for free exercise, the 
prohibition on the establishment of a state religion constitutes 
the foundational right upon which all other fundamental rights 
and freedoms depend.4  Thus, “[f]or the seeker of religious 
truth…religious freedom creates the conditions, the 
‘constitutional space,’ for investigation and the pursuit of 
truth.”5  Free exercise of religion itself “embraces two concepts,—
freedom to believe and freedom to act;”6 “[i]t is . . . because of the 
close linkage of expression [action] to the inner domain of 
‘thought, conscience and religion’, and thereby to the core of 
human dignity, that freedom of expression is so important in the 
constellation of constitutional and human rights.”7  Free exercise 
of religion and the freedom to believe (the internal forum of 
conscience) and to act on one’s beliefs (the external forum that 
occurs in the “public square”) therefore sit at the very core of the 
matrix of fundamental human rights and freedoms recognized 
and protected in most western liberal systems. 
It is unsurprising, then, that the right to free exercise finds 
protection both in international human rights instruments and 
 
3.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424. 
4.  See generally Brett G. Scharffs, Why Religious Freedom? Why the 
Religiously Committed, the Religiously Indifferent, and Those Hostile to 
Religion Should Care, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 957 (2017). 
5.  Id. at 958 n.2 (footnote omitted).  
6.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). 
7.  W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: 
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 165 (Aspen 
Publishers 2010). 
3
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in national constitutions.8  Figure 1 below illustrates the 
continuum of constitutional approaches to free exercise, along 
which the approaches of various nations could be plotted; at one 
end, secular states, and at the other, theocratic. 
 
Figure 1: Continuum of Constitutionalism9 
 
 
 
 
At one end of this continuum one finds those nations that 
take a secular approach to religion with some form of separation 
between church and state and a protection for free exercise of 
religion.  At the other end lies theocracy where the church and 
state are fused or synthesized.  At the secular end of the 
continuum, further specificity is possible amongst four possible 
variants of secularity, listed from most secular to most 
theocratic: (i) those nations which practice state atheism or 
active elimination of religion from the public square; (ii) laïcité, 
or assertive secularism, (iii) secularism as neutrality, and (iv) 
‘soft’ formal separation.  At the middle of the continuum one 
finds weak religious establishment and de facto establishment, 
and so on through an additional four gradations of theocracy or 
synthesizing of church and state. 
Yet, when attempting to define any one nation, it becomes 
clear that the constitutional approach to religion taken in most 
states oscillates around a number of points, or zones of the 
continuum.  No precise description sufficiently captures how a 
 
8.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act, 1982, c 11, § 2(a)–(b) (U.K.); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, March 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, at 18 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
9.  See Paul Babie, Religion and Constitutionalism: Oscillations Along a 
Continuum, 39 J. RELIGIOUS HIST. 123, 130 (2015). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1
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nation uses constitutionalism to mediate the relationship 
between religion and state.10  Instead, what one finds are three 
zones: (i) Secular/Separation; (ii) Separation/Mild Privileging; 
and (iii) Establishment/Theocratic.  These zones are further 
outlined in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Oscillation and Zones Along the Continuum of 
Constitutionalism11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The United States, for instance, while certainly at the 
Secular end of the continuum, probably sits much closer to its 
center than one might otherwise think.  Indeed, the United 
States very likely ends up within the Separation/Mild 
Privileging Zone.  In short, what one might assume about a 
nation’s treatment of religion is not always the reality upon a 
full examination of constitutional and other legal texts and their 
interpretation by the courts.12 
In this article, we consider two federal constitutional 
democracies, India and Australia, which best fit at the secular 
end of the continuum within the Secular/Separation Zone 
because they actively separate church and state and protect the 
free exercise of religion.  Moreover, both constitutional systems 
 
10.  See generally id. at 130. 
11.  Id. at 135. 
12.  Id. at 124–37. 
5
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emerged from the former British Empire and both continue 
membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, which followed 
the end of the Empire.13  However, the similarities end there, as 
they achieve Secular/Separation of church and state in very 
different ways. 
Part I of this article focuses on India’s Constitution, which 
contains express provisions that comprehensively protect free 
exercise.  Part II demonstrates that while one finds what might 
appear a protection for free exercise in the Australian 
Constitution, such protection is far from comprehensive.  
Instead, as shown in this Article, unlike its Indian counterpart, 
the Australian federal democracy depends upon a piecemeal 
collection of Constitutional, legislative, and common-law 
provisions which, when taken together, seem to achieve plenary 
protection for free exercise.  The introductory comparative 
assessment presented here demonstrates that while India 
protects free exercise in a comprehensive constitutional 
protection, and while Australia does so in a disjointed and 
fragmentary way, both arrive at the same place: a constitutional 
secular/separation in substance, ensuring a separation of church 
and state with a corresponding comprehensive protection for 
free exercise. 
 
I. India 
 
A. Secular Federation 
 
As it was prior to independence, India today is home to 
multiple religious communities.14  It was the unity of those 
religions that led the fight against discrimination and the 
establishment of basic rights relating to life and liberty, 
specifically free exercise.15  However, that struggle for freedom 
 
13.  W. DAVID MCINTYRE, THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS: ORIGINS AND 
IMPACT, 1869–1971 (U of Minn. Press, 1977). 
14.  Press Release, WIN-Gallup Int’l, Global Index of Religion and 
Atheism 14 (2012), https://sidmennt.is/wp-content/uploads/Gallup-
International-um-trú-og-trúleysi-2012.pdf (explaining that India is the 18th 
most religious country in the world according to a 2012 survey, which found 
that at least 81 percent of Indians claim to have religious sentiments). 
15.  Id. at 14. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1
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left behind two nations.16  The first, India, afforded its citizens 
religious freedom.17  The other, Pakistan, was left without it.  As 
the Indian independence movement came closer to the 
realization of the Indian Constitution, a combination of the 
agitation for religious supremacy among certain groups, the 
separation of electorates, and the partition movement, made it 
more urgent to declare India a secular state.18  It is well 
established that India’s struggle against British rule was fought 
on the basis of equality for all faiths and their followers.19  
Characterized by religious diversity, the Indian independence 
movement led to the establishment of various religious 
protections in the Indian Constitution—some of which 
addressed specific religious traditions—giving birth to a concept 
of secularism that differs from the way in which the rest of the 
world understands it.20 
India is primarily a secular country.21  While it is true that 
the Indian Constitution established state secularism, nowhere 
does it define the concept of secularism.  This does not mean that 
it is undefinable and ambiguous; the concept is based upon 
certain postulates,22 such as an implied prohibition on an official 
religion and on the state recognition of a church or religion, 
among others.  Free exercise as a right finds its place in Part 3 
of the Indian Constitution, in the form of a guarantee against 
discrimination on the ground of religion.23  Thus, the Indian 
 
16.  1 DURGA D BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 4–7 (14th ed., 
LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur 2009); see also M.P. JAIN, INDIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14 (5th ed., Wadhwa Nagpur 2007). 
17.  BASU, supra note 16; JAIN, supra note 16, at 14. 
18.  BASU, supra note 16; JAIN, supra note 16, at 14. 
19.  Tahir Mahmood, Professedly Secular vs. Conspicuously Communal, 
HINDU (May 1, 2014, 12:50 AM), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-
ed/professedly-secular-vs-conspicuously-communal/article5963508.ece. 
20.  Id. 
21.  S R Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 (India); see also P.M. 
BAKSHI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 4 (13th ed., Universal Law Publ’g 2015). 
22.  JAIN, supra note 16, at 14. 
23.  Part 3 of the Indian Constitution, which deals with ‘Fundamental 
Rights’, was discussed for as many as 38 days in the drafting process.  SUBHASH 
C. KASHYAP, OUR CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIA’S CONSTITUTION 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94 (5th ed., Nat’l Book Trust 2011).  B.R. Ambedkar, 
Minister of Law and Justice, described it as “the most criticized part.”  Id. 
7
ARTICLE 1_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/03/2019  7:54 PM 
8 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.1 
state is constitutionally bound to treat all religions equally.24 
The secular character was debated greatly in the 
Constituent Assembly; Professor K. T. Shah advocated in favor 
of inclusion of the words secular, federal, and socialist in Article 
1 of the Indian Constitution: 
 
As regards the Secular character of the State, we 
have been told time and again from every 
platform, that ours is a secular State. If that is 
true, if that holds good, I do not see why the term 
could not be added or inserted in the constitution 
itself, once again, to guard against any possibility 
of misunderstanding or misapprehension. The 
term ‘secular’, I agree, does not find place 
necessarily in constitutions on which ours seems 
to have been modelled. But every constitution is 
framed in the background of the people concerned. 
The mere fact, therefore, that such description is 
not formally or specifically adopted to distinguish 
one state from another, or to emphasis [sic] the 
character of ourstate [sic] is no reason, in my 
opinion, why we should not insert now at this 
hour, when we are making our constitution, this 
very clear and emphatic description of that 
State.25 
 
The amendment was not accepted by B. R. Ambedkar, then 
Minister of Law and Justice.26  After a long debate on the 
meaning of secular, the Indian Constitution was enacted and 
enforced on January 26, 1950 without explicit reference to it.  It 
was not until 1976 that secular was inserted into the Preamble 
to the Indian Constitution.  The object of the insertion of the 
word was to make explicit the principle of secularism.  However, 
the secular nature of the Indian Constitution was already 
embodied in the enacting provisions under Articles 25–30.  The 
 
24.  Id. at 94. 
25.  7 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES (PROCEEDINGS) 5 (Nov. 15, 1948), 
http://164.100.47.194/loksabha/writereaddata/cadebatefiles/C15111948.pdf. 
26.  Id. at 9. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1
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debate on the secular character of the Indian Constitution has 
treated Indian secularism variously, from an implicit principle 
to an explicit term.  However, the leading judgments of the 
Supreme Court of India lend this debate clarity.  On the basis of 
the relevant cases, a conclusion can be drawn that secularism 
was the original constitutional principle.  Secularism did not 
exist in degree; the implicit-versus-explicit debate could not, 
therefore, either lower or raise the constitutional sanctity 
afforded to this value.  In 1973, the Supreme Court of India dealt 
with the word secular in Bharati v. State of Kerala, and held that 
secularism is part of the basic structure of the Indian 
Constitution, unamendable by the Parliament of India under its 
amending power: Article 368 of the Indian Constitution.27  In 
1975, the Supreme Court of India in Gandhi v. Narain explained 
the basic feature of secularism to mean that “[t]he State shall 
have no religion of its own and all persons shall be equally 
entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, 
practice and propagate religion.”28 
These interpretations of secularism by the Supreme Court 
in various cases leave no doubt as to the conclusion that the 
Indian Constitution provides for a fundamentally secular state.  
This state secularism is supported structurally from within, and 
beyond, the fundamental document of the state.  Additionally, 
debates about the source of this secularism are obviated by the 
constitutional structure.  In short, as governed by its 
Constitution, in accordance with the principle of the rule of law, 
India prohibits even a parliamentary majority to destroy the 
Indian guarantee of secularism.29  This places India among other 
countries which forbid official religion: the United States,30 
 
27.  Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 307, 316, 518, 1480 
(India). 
28.  Gandhi v. Narain, (1975) 2 SCC 159, 664 (India).  
29.  Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 (explaining that secularism 
is part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution, a theory propounded 
in Bharati by 13 judges); see also Bharati, 4 SCC 225. 
30.  See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (“The 
‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: 
Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church . . ..  No 
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.”). 
9
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Australia,31 and France, with its doctrine of laïcité.32  To reverse 
Lord Burleigh’s famous maxim, Indian secularism could never 
be ruined by a parliament.33 
 
B. Indian Constitution 
 
As has been shown, secularism is one of the basic structural 
components of the Indian Constitution.  It is part of the original 
structure and not an extension of any part or component of that 
structure.  Since 1973, secularism was interpreted and 
expounded, but not invented by the Supreme Court.  The 
foundations of secularism are found primarily in the provisions 
of Articles 25–28 of the Indian Constitution.  And in other 
provisions, secularism is given a strong role; for example, 
Articles 29 and 30 address the rights of cultural and educational 
rights of minorities, enshrine freedoms of conscience, profession, 
practice, and propagation. 
Article 25 provides that “all persons are equally entitled to 
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise 
and propagate” their religion.34  However, this right, like other 
rights, is not absolute.  The State may put reasonable 
restrictions upon the exercise of such rights on the grounds of 
public order, morality, or health.  Article 26 extends the 
protection to the freedom to manage religious affairs.  As with 
Article 25, the freedom to manage religious affairs is not 
absolute.  The State can curtail this freedom, too, on the same 
grounds.  Read together, the provisions extend their protection 
to matters of faith, doctrines, or belief, as well as acts done in 
pursuance of religion, and, therefore, contain a guarantee for 
rituals, observances, ceremonies, and modes of worship, which 
 
31.  Australian Constitution s 116 (prohibiting the Federal Parliament 
from establishing an official religion and from prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion. This is discussed further in the Part II of this article). 
32.  1958 CONST. 1 (Fr.) (explaining that Laïcité is a core concept of the 
French Constitution. Article 1 states that France is a secular republic: “La 
France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale.”). 
33.  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161 
(21st ed. 1857) (“England could never be ruined but by a parliament”). 
34.  INDIA CONST., art. 25. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1
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are an essential or an integral part of religion.35 
Articles 24 and 25 ensure both an internal and an external 
freedom for practicing religion.  This is an individual freedom 
that belongs to everyone, so the freedom of one cannot encroach 
upon a similar freedom belonging to another.36  Because the 
State must maintain secularity, any such encroachment is a 
State concern.  This freedom is given by the Indian Constitution, 
and it is the Constitutional duty of the State to ensure that the 
persons entitled to the freedom must enjoy it.  The State cannot 
sit as a spectator in such situations of interreligious tension by 
saying that it is secular.  That the State is secular means that it 
may have equal faith in all the religions, or that it may have no 
religion; it must, in other words, maintain neutrality.  Unlike 
the State, an individual may have faith in a religion in 
accordance with his or her choice, or he or she may opt not to 
choose any religion.  In both situations, the constitutional 
guarantee of faith extends to him or her.  In the Indian 
framework, then, the individual enjoys two rights: religion and 
secularism.  Both are available to the individual, but because it 
is bound to be secular, the State does not have a choice.  
Therefore, under the secular obligations of the Indian 
Constitution, the State must administer its duty in affairs of 
religion (faith and/or acts which are an essential part of the 
religion) concerning any individual or group of individuals. 
To retain the secular character of the Indian Constitution, 
free exercise is ensured by giving internal and external freedom 
to individuals to practice the essential parts of one’s religion.  In 
addition to this, Article 27 establishes a general policy that any 
money paid from public funds for promoting or maintaining any 
particular religion not be taxed.37  Further, Article 28 provides 
for a freedom to attend religious instruction or to worship in 
certain educational institutions.  Again, by classifying the 
institutions of education, the secular character of the State has 
 
35.  Comm’r of Police v. Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770, 782–83 (India) 
(stating “to persons believing in religious faith, there are some forms of 
practicing the religion by outward actions which are as much part of religion 
is [sic] the faith itself”). 
36.  Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 2 SCR 611 (India). 
37.  INDIA CONST. art. 27 (prohibiting the levying of a tax of which the 
proceeds are meant specifically for payment of expenses for the promotion or 
maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination). 
11
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been maintained.  Article 28(1) provides that “No religious 
instruction shall be provided in any educational institution 
wholly maintained out of State funds.”38  However, there is no 
prohibition on the “study of religious philosophy and culture, 
particularly for having value based social life in a society which 
is degenerating….”39 
  
1. Nature of the Right 
 
Indian free exercise, internal and external, is a fundamental 
right enshrined in Part Three of the Indian Constitution.  By 
making it a fundamental freedom, the framers of the Indian 
Constitution have treated this freedom as an indispensable 
human right.  In the case of violation, a remedy lies under 
Articles 226 and 32 of the Indian Constitution.  Article 32 vests 
the Supreme Court with jurisdiction in cases of a violation of 
fundamental rights.  The right to religious freedom is based in 
the principle of secularism, which warrants the equal treatment 
of persons of all religions and of those who have no religion.  
Article 14 guarantees, in a general sense, the equality of all 
persons before the law in India.  Therefore, the constitutional 
right to religious freedom is a particularized right that strikes 
against the generality of Article 14.  This means that the nature 
of the right which ensures religious freedom is directed against 
arbitrariness and, being a basic structure of the Indian 
Constitution,40 cannot be amended.  It is, then, one of the basic 
components of the Indian rule of law, consistent with the 
principles of a just constitutional order.41 
Secularism, a basic structure of the Indian Constitution, 
therefore has the following components: 
 
 Article 14: general principle of equality before the law;42 
 Articles 15 and 16: prohibition against discrimination on 
 
38.  Id. art. 25. 
39.  Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 368. 
40.  Bommai v Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 184; see also 
Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India). 
41.  See generally A. V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 
J.W.F. Allison ed. 1915). 
42.  INDIA CONST. art. 14. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1
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the ground of religion;43 
 Articles 19 and 21: freedom of speech and expression;44 
 Articles 25 to 28: freedom of religious practices;45 
 Articles 29 and 30: freedom of operation of educational 
institutions by linguistic and religious minorities;46 
 Articles 17 and 25(2)(b): grounds for the State to make 
reforms within institutions of the Hindu religion;47 
 Article 44: an aspiration for the State to enact uniform 
civil laws treating all citizens as equal throughout 
India;48 
 Article 48: sentiments of majority of people towards cows 
and against their slaughter;49 
 Article 325: equal ballots.50 
 
With respect to the relationship between protections for 
equal treatment of citizens, and the constitutional principle of 
secularism, the Court’s interpretation of two expressions in 
Article 14 is enlightening.51  The Supreme Court, in Srinivasa 
 
43.  Id. at art. 15–16. 
44.  Id. at art. 19–21. 
45.  Id. at art. 25–28. 
46.  Id. at art. 29–30. 
47.  Id. at art. 17, 25(2)(b). 
48.  Id. at art. 44. 
49.  Id. at art. 48.  This demonstrates the secular content of Indian 
constitutional law.  In its wider sense, it also incorporates the notion of 
allowing animals fair and just treatment as a part of their natural rights.  See, 
e.g., Hanuma v. State of Telangana, (2017) Crl.R.C. 517 (India) (“[a] cattle 
which has served human beings is entitled to compassion in its old age when 
it has ceased to be milch or draught and becomes so-called ‘useless’. It will be 
an act of reprehensible ingratitude to condemn a cattle in its old age as useless 
and send it to a slaughter house taking away the little time from its natural 
life that it would have lived, forgetting its service for the major part of its life, 
for which it had remained milch or draught. We have to remember: the weak 
and meek need more of protection and compassion.”); see also BASU, supra note 
16, at 651. 
50.  INDIA CONST. art. 325. (stating “[n]o person to be ineligible for 
inclusion in, or claim to be included in a special, electoral roll on grounds of 
religion . . .”). 
51.  Id. at art. 14 (stating “[t]he State shall not deny to any person equality 
before the law or equal protection of laws within the territory of India.”) 
(emphasis added). 
13
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Theatre v. Gov’t of Tamil Nadu,52 explains that the operation of 
the constitutional principle of equality before the law expressed 
in Article 14 establishes equality as a dynamic concept, and one 
which has many facets.  One such facet is an obligation upon the 
State to bring about, through the machinery of law, a more equal 
society, as envisaged by the Preamble and Part 4 of the Indian 
Constitution.53  This creates a State obligation to bring about a 
more equal society in respect of the social, economic, and 
political status of its citizens.  While discharging this duty, the 
State ought to treat secularism as one of the tools of the 
machinery of law that may bring about equality. 
 
2. Interpretation and Limitations 
 
The framers of the Indian Constitution thought that religion 
aided the creation of an ordered society.  Nevertheless, they 
assessed that throughout the world, irrespective of territorial 
boundaries, “[t]here [was] no modern and efficient constitution 
in the world which [was] based on a particular religion.”54  The 
right to free exercise, therefore, sought to balance two aims: first, 
the freedom for communities to practice religion in such a way 
that protected the spiritual well-being of each religious 
community, and, second, the secular interest in a state which 
could make laws to provide for the public welfare.  The Indian 
constitutional protection for free exercise ensures citizens’ 
 
52.  Srinivasa Theatre v. Gov’t of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 2 SCR 164 (India).  
53.  INDIA CONST. pmbl. (“WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly 
resolved to constitute India into a [SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] and to secure to all its citizens . . . EQUALITY of 
status and of opportunity”); Id. art. 39 (stating several “directive principles of 
state policy” aimed at achieving economic equalities among Indian citizens).  
54.  2 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES (PROCEEDINGS) 13 at ¶ 80 (Jan. 21, 
1947), https://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/2/19 
47-01-24; see also 3 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES (PROCEEDINGS) 18 at ¶ 
218 (Apr. 29, 1947), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/747690/ (distinguishing 
between ‘religion’ and ‘creed,’ Kamath states “I think the word religion is not 
comprehensive enough to include in its scope creed as well. For instance, a 
person may not accept any religion in the conventional or formal sense of the 
term, yet he may have a creed. A man may say that he has no religion, yet he 
may say that he is a rationalist or a free-thinker and that I suppose is a creed 
which anybody can profess and still he may say that he does not belong to the 
Hindu, Muslim or Sikh religion, or for the matter of that to any other 
religion.”). 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1
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spiritual well-being by allowing them freely to profess, practice, 
and propagate their faith with free conscience.55  On the other 
hand, due weight is given to public welfare by emphasizing the 
State secularism that the Indian Constitution seeks to realize.  
Therefore, free exercise is not an absolute, but qualified right.  
Accordingly, Articles 25 and 26 enumerate certain grounds upon 
which the State can restrict religious freedom, including: (a) 
public order, morality, health; (b) grounds in respect of other 
provisions of the Indian Constitution; (c) the regulation of non-
religious activity associated with religious practice; (d) social 
welfare and reform; and (e) the openness of Hindu religious 
institutions of a public character to all classes of Hindus.56 
One striking point in this system is that while the Indian 
Constitution guarantees religious freedom, the term religion is 
nowhere defined in the text.  Religion is taken as a matter of 
faith and belief in a common meaning.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
defines religion as: 
 
. . . a matter of faith with individuals or 
communities and it is not necessarily theistic. 
There are well known religions in India like 
Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in 
God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion 
undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or 
doctrines which are regarded by those who profess 
that religion as conducive to their spiritual well 
being, but it would not be correct to say that 
religion is nothing else, but a . . . doctrine or belief. 
A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical 
rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe 
rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of 
worship which are regarded as integral parts of 
religion, and these forms and observances might 
extend even to matters of food and dress.57 
 
55.  INDIA CONST. art. 25. 
56.  Id. at art. 25(2)(b) (allowing the state to make a law “providing for 
social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions 
of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.”). 
57.  Comm’r of Hindu Religious Endowments v. Swamiar, (1954) SCR 
1005 (India) (emphasis added). 
15
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The Court, while interpreting free exercise, observed that a 
“religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief.  It has its 
outward expression in acts as well.”58  Accordingly, the Indian 
Constitution not only protects religious beliefs, but also acts done 
in pursuance of those beliefs.  However, if religious practices run 
counter to public order, morality, health, or a policy of social 
welfare upon which the state has embarked, such practices must 
give way.59  The good of citizens as a whole prevails in any 
instance of conflict between the principles of the State and those 
of a particular religion. 
 
3. Regulation of Religious Acts 
 
Acts done in pursuance of religion for spiritual well-being 
are protected, but those done under the administration of a 
religious institution are not.  Instead, they are covered by the 
secular functions of the State.60  Therefore, no mahant,61 
pujari,62 or trustee, in a religious place, can declare an area or 
particular practices to fall under the essential category of 
practices related to religion and, therefore, to be protected from 
interference.  There is a clear line between religious practice and 
secular practice, each having different objectives.  Therefore, 
activities like the (a) management of a temple, (b) maintenance 
of discipline, (c) order inside the temple, (d) control of activities 
of temple staff, or (e) payment of remuneration to them, are all 
secular concerns falling under state administration and can be 
regulated by the State’s laws.63  As regards offerings made in a 
temple, to share them is not a religious right, but a secular one, 
 
58.  Gandhi v. State of Bombay, (1954) SCR 1035 (India); see also Seth v. 
State of U.P., AIR 1957 All. 411 (India). 
59.  State of Bombay v. Mali, AIR 1952 BOM 84 (India).  
60.  Yatendrulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1414 (India); 
see also Visheshwara v. State of U. P. (1997) 2 SCR 1086 (India).  
61.  The mahant is a religious leader, commonly the leader of a temple or 
a monastery, in the Hindu and Sikh religions.  JAIN, supra note 16, at 1262. 
62.  The pujari is a priest of the Hindu temple.  English translation of 
'पुजारी', COLLINS, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/hindi-english/पुजारी 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
63.  State of Orissa v. Khuntia, (1997) 8 SCC 422 (India). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1
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held by sevaks,64 by way of remuneration for their secular 
duties.65 
The discussion above draws a distinction between 
fundamentally religious acts and another class of practices, 
which, though associated with religion, are not an integral and 
essential part of it.  These practices find no protection under 
Articles 25–28 of the Indian Constitution.  Such practices 
associated with religion are treated as a matter of public concern 
and may be the subject of state law under the secular 
Constitution.  The Constitution expresses these limitations on 
the practice of religion as qualifications to the provisions which 
confer free exercise.  Thus, a purportedly religious practice that 
goes beyond what might be considered integral to religion may 
be subject to State regulation pursuant to law as a matter of  
secular faith.  For instance, in Comm’r of Police v. Avadhuta, the 
Supreme Court held that the Tandava, a divine dance performed 
in public places, is not to be considered an essential part of 
Ananda Marga, a religious philosophical movement with ties to 
Hinduism.66  In Faruqui v. Union of India,67 it was held that the 
mosque is not an essential part of the practice of Islam, and that 
namaz, Islamic prayer, can be offered anywhere, even in the 
open.  Accordingly, in that case, it was held that the acquisition 
of land on which a mosque was built was not prohibited by the 
provisions of the Indian Constitution which establish free 
exercise.68 
In Quareshi v. State of Bihar,69 the Petitioner submitted 
that slaughter of cows on Eid al-Adha (the Islamic “Feast of 
Sacrifice”) was an essential practice of his religion.  It was 
contended that the sacrifice of cows on the feast day was 
enjoined by the Koran.  Therefore, it was argued, the practice 
must be considered as an integral part of Islam.  The Court, after 
reviewing the evidence, determined that the practice is not an 
 
64.  Sevaks are servants who provide services in the temple, and outside 
it, but under its management.  English translation of 'सेवक', COLLINS, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/hindi-english (last visited Feb. 8, 
2019). 
65.  Khuntia, 8 SCC 422.  
66.  Comm’r of Police v. Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770 (India). 
67.  Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360 (India). 
68.  Id. at [96]–[97]. 
69.  Quareshi v. State of Bihar, (1959) SCR 629 (India). 
17
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essential part of Islam.  Therefore, the State could regulate the 
practice. 
 
4. Protection of Individual Rights 
 
As discussed above, free exercise is an individual right and 
belongs to every person.  Therefore, the freedom of one person 
cannot encroach upon the same freedom of another.70  To that 
end, the protection of the propagation of religion in Article 25(1) 
of the Indian Constitution does not grant a right “to convert 
another person to one’s own religion but to transmit or spread 
one’s religion by an exposition of its tenets.”71  In India, different 
religious communities follow different religious laws to deal with 
their particular affairs.  Some religious laws and customs permit 
polygamy.  In the case of Islam, men are permitted to have 
multiple wives, but Islamic law does not allow a woman to have 
multiple husbands.  However, Section 494 of the Indian Penal 
Code 1860 makes it an offense for a person, having a living 
husband or wife, to marry another.  A similar provision is also 
found in British law.72  To avoid liability under Section 494 of 
the Indian Penal Code 1860, a person cannot claim protection 
because the religion he or she practices allows polygamy. Article 
25 extends no such protection.  In Mudgal v. Union of India,73 
the Supreme Court held that a Hindu man, being married to a 
Hindu wife, and who later converted to Islam, could not marry a 
second wife in Islamic law because that marriage would infringe 
the rights of the first Hindu wife.  This shows that secular law 
prevails above religious law in important legislative areas. 
It is clear, then, that the constitutional right to free exercise 
is not absolute.  Rather, it is expressly qualified by limitations 
enumerated by the provisions from which the right itself is 
 
70.  Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224, 62 (India) (stating 
“[f]reedom guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution is such freedom 
which does not encroach upon a similar freedom of the other persons. Under 
the constitutional scheme every person has a fundamental right not merely to 
entertain the religious belief of his choice but also to exhibit his belief and ideas 
in a manner which does not infringe the religious right and personal freedom 
of others.”). 
71.  Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 2 SCR 611, 616 (India). 
72.  Offences Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, § 57 (UK).  
73.  Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 (India).  
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sourced.  And on a number of occasions, the Supreme Court of 
India has dealt with various conflicts between religious practices 
and interfering State laws, in which it has developed the 
limitations upon the right with reference not only to the religious 
aim of achieving spiritual well-being, but also to the policy of 
social welfare of the State.  This was emphasized by the former 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Ramesh Chandra Lahoti 
who, referring to the treatment of secular constitutions in 
religious thought, quoted a verse from the Srimad Bhagavad 
Gita (“Song of God”), one part of the great epic poem the 
Mahabharata, which is an important text in the Hindu faith: 
 
In Shrimad Bhagvat Gita Lord Krishna has said: 
 
Sarva dharmani parityajyam mamekam 
sharanam brajah:74 
 
What is meant is – do practice and profess your 
religion, yet surrender to Me as I am Religion of 
all religions. Adapting this shloka to our 
Constitution, it can be said – our Constitution is 
Religion of all religions and unconditional 
surrender to the command of the Constitution, 
rising above the narrow dogmas can resolve our 
several issues.75 
 
The emphasis that Lahoti places on Indian secularism 
shows that both individual religious freedom and the neutrality 
of the State towards religion remain fundamental principles of 
Indian constitutionalism.  Thus, while the Indian federal 
democracy clearly resides at the Secular end of the Continuum 
of Constitutionalism in Figure 1 above, and the 
Secular/Separation Zone of Oscillation in Figure 2, it also 
provides for a robust, comprehensive protection for free exercise 
 
74.  A.C. BHAKTIVEDANTA SWAMI PRABHUPADA, BHAGAVAD-GITA: AS IT IS 
749 (2d ed., Bhaktivendanta Book Trust-Mumbai 1989). 
75.  R. C. Lahoti, Chief Justice of India, Lecture on Constitutional Values 
Delivered in Celebration of Constitution Day at the Supreme Court (Nov. 26, 
2017). 
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of religion.  We turn next to consider the way in which Australia 
arrives at the same position on the continuum. 
 
II. Australia76 
 
A. Secular Federation 
 
Like India, Australia, from its establishment as a 
constitutional federal democracy in 1901, has been a secular 
state.  Unlike India, however, secularism is something that 
emerges largely from the conventions that led to the adoption of 
the text of the Australian Constitution itself as much as from 
judicial interpretation.  We see this assurance emerge, then, 
from the interplay of competing visions for the Australian 
federation among the framers of the Constitution during the 
Constitutional Convention debates of the 1890s.  Prior to that 
time, the colonies, which would ultimately federate to become 
the Australian States, were largely non-secular, adhering to one 
degree or another to the doctrines of the Anglican Church of 
England.  It was during the debates that produced the 
Australian Constitution that some framers sought to make 
reference to God in the text of the draft constitution, while others 
sought to ensure a separation of church and state.77  The 
secularity of the Australian federal system therefore begins with 
the Preamble to the Constitution, which reads: “WHEREAS the 
people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of 
Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal 
Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby 
established[.]”78 
John Quick, one of the framers of the Australian 
 
76.  Parts of earlier versions of this section were previously published as 
Paul Babie, Freedom of Religion in Australia: An Introductory Outline, 13 
AMITY L. REV. 1 (2017); Paul Babie, The Concept of Freedom of Religion in the 
Australian Constitution: A Study in Legislative-Judicial Cooperative 
Innovation, 1 QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 259 (2018). 
77.  See generally RICHARD ELY, UNTO GOD AND CAESAR: RELIGIOUS ISSUES 
IN THE EMERGING COMMONWEALTH 1891-1906 (Melbourne Univ. Press 1976). 
78.  Australian Constitution pmbl. 
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Constitution, and Robert Garran, the secretary of the framers 
drafting committee, in their annotated edition of the Australian 
Constitution, published contemporaneously with its 
promulgation in 1901,79 wrote that “the Federal 
[Commonwealth] Parliament might, owing to the recital in the 
preamble, be held to possess power with respect to religion of 
which we have no conception.  Consequently . . . the power to 
deal with religion in every shape and form should be clearly 
denied to the Federal Parliament.”80  Yet, if the State was to 
remain secular, how could this potential power be balanced as 
against the separation of church and state and the freedom of 
religious adherents to believe in and practice their faith?  The 
framers sought to achieve this through the insertion of a clause 
within the substantive terms of the Constitution, which would 
check the power seemingly contained in the Preamble. 
But would the protection against the Commonwealth power 
contained in the Preamble apply only to the Commonwealth 
(federal) government, or to the states as well?  Answering this 
question involves a long and complex story running over the 
course of many years—ultimately, though, among the framers, 
it was Henry Higgins who “propos[ed] . . . a simple ban on 
religious legislation or religious tests by the Commonwealth, 
and was careful to emphasize that in this field existing State 
powers would be left intact . . . the States were left free [in the 
final form of the Constitution], if they wished, to legislate for 
religious intolerance.”81  Put simply, the framers ultimately 
concluded that, because the ostensible power to legislate with 
respect to religion contained in the Preamble was a 
Commonwealth power, the States need not be so limited.  As 
such, 
 
If God were ‘recognized,’ a large number of good 
people would need to be reassured that ‘their 
rights with respect to religion [would] not be 
interfered with’ …. Higgins then alleged, ‘the 
 
79.  JOHN QUICK & ROBERT RANDOLPH GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 952 (Legal Books Sydney 
reprint 1976) (1901).  
80.  ELY, supra note 77. 
81.  Id. 
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recognition of God was not proposed merely out of 
reverence; it was proposed for distinct political 
purposes under the influence of debates which 
have taken place in the United States of America.’ 
In 1892 the United States Supreme Court had 
declared that country ‘a Christian country’, and 
this declaration had given rise to an intense 
political campaign to ‘impose . . . a compulsory 
sabbath all through, in, and upon every state, and 
a lifting of the banner of those who opposed that 
movement’ . . . . [E]xperience showed that the 
presence of a declaration of a religious character 
in the preamble might form the basis for attempts 
to pass legislation ‘of a character which I do not 
think we intend to give the Federal 
Commonwealth power to pass…. I do not think 
that we ought to interfere with the right of the 
states to do anything they choose, if they think fit 
to do anything.’82 
 
The framers ultimately accepted Higgins’ position and 
included what is now Section 116 in the Australian 
Constitution.83  The Australian Constitution, which came into 
effect on January 1, 1901, thus contains an assurance of state 
secularity.  Yet, notwithstanding the protections found therein, 
comprehensive protection for free exercise in Australia involves 
the convergence of those protections with Commonwealth and 
state legislation.  We now turn to consider the operation of the 
Australian Constitution as it concerns free exercise. 
 
B. Australian Constitution 
 
Two aspects of the Australian Constitution ensure the 
protection of free exercise: first, the provisions of Section 116, 
and, second, the parameters of the implied freedom of political 
communication.  We consider each in turn. 
 
82.  Id. at 61–62. 
83.  Luke Beck, Higgins’ Argument for Section 116 of the Constitution, 41 
FED. L. REV. 393, 402 (2013). 
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1. Section 116 
 
Section 116 provides that: “The Commonwealth shall not 
make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any 
religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification 
for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.”84  At 
first blush, Section 116 seems a robust protection for free 
exercise, containing four separate guarantees: against the 
establishment of a state religion, prohibiting the imposition of 
religious observance, of free exercise, and of a religious test for 
holding an office of the Commonwealth government. 
An application of Section 116 requires, first, that one 
determine what is meant by religion.  While it dealt with the 
application of tax exemptions for religious organizations, the 
High Court in Church of the New Faith v. Comm’r for Pay-Roll 
Tax85 established the legal definition of religion for the purposes 
of applying Section 116.  That case contained three judgments 
offering three different definitions of religion.  The first, typically 
taken as the controlling definition, is found in Mason A.C.J. and 
Brennan J’s opinion, in which they established two criteria: 
 
First, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or 
Principle; and second, the acceptance of canons of 
conduct in order to give effect to that belief, 
though canons of conduct which offend against the 
ordinary laws are outside the area of any 
immunity, privilege or right conferred on the 
grounds of religion.86 
Justices Wilson and Deane set out five indicia: (i) “that the 
particular collection of ideas and/or practices involves belief in 
the supernatural,” or being something that could not be 
perceived by the senses; (ii) “that the ideas relate to man’s 
 
84.  Australian Constitution s 116. 
85.  Church of the New Faith v. Comm’r of Pay-Roll Tax (1983) 
154 CLR 120 (Austl.). 
86.  Id. at 137. 
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nature and place in the universe and his relation to things 
supernatural;” (iii) “that the . . . adherents [accept certain ideas 
as] requiring or encouraging them to observe particular 
standards or codes of conduct or to participate in specific 
practices having supernatural significance;” (iv) “Adherents . . . 
constitute an identifiable group or identifiable groups;” and (v) 
The adherents themselves see the collection of ideas and/or, 
practices as constituting a religion.87 
Justice Murphy provided the broadest definition: 
 
Religious freedom is a fundamental theme of our 
society. That freedom has been asserted by men 
and women throughout history by resisting the 
attempts of government, through its legislative, 
executive or judicial branches, to define or impose 
beliefs or practices of religion. Whenever the 
legislature prescribes what religion is, or permits 
or requires the executive or the judiciary to 
determine what religion is, this poses a threat to 
religious freedom. Religious discrimination by 
officials or by courts is unacceptable in a free 
society. The truth or falsity of religions is not the 
business of officials or the courts. If each 
purported religion had to show that its doctrines 
were true, then all might fail. Administrators and 
judges must resist the temptation to hold that 
groups or institutions are not religious because 
claimed religious beliefs or practices seem absurd, 
fraudulent, evil or novel; or because the group or 
institution is new, the number of adherents small, 
the leaders hypocrites, or because they seek to 
obtain the financial and other privileges which 
come with religious status. In the eyes of the law, 
religions are equal. There is no religious club with 
a monopoly of State privileges for its members. 
The policy of the law is “one in, all in”.88 
 
87.  Id. at 164–77.  For a summary, see Mark Darian-Smith, Church of 
the New Faith v Comm’r for Pay-Roll Tax, 14 MELB. U. L. REV. 539, 543 (1984). 
88.  Church of the New Faith, 154 CLR at 150. 
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Establishing that one’s beliefs constitute a religion triggers 
the operation of Section 116, the application of which is then a 
matter of judicial interpretation.  Early in the history of 
Australian federation, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (“J.C.P.C.”), while still the final appellate court for 
Australia, suggested that Section 116 contained a guarantee of 
individual rights:89 
 
It is true that a Constitution must not be 
construed in any narrow and pedantic sense.  The 
words used are necessarily general, and their full 
import and true meaning can often only be 
appreciated when considered, as the years go on, 
in relation to the vicissitudes of fact which from 
time to time emerge.  It is not that the meaning of 
the words changed, but the changing 
circumstances illustrate and illuminate the full 
import of that meaning. It has been said that “in 
interpreting a constituent or organic statute…, 
that construction most beneficial to the widest 
possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted”. 
But that principle may not be helpful when the 
section is, as s 92 may seem to be, a constitutional 
guarantee of rights, analogous to the guarantee of 
religious freedom in s 116, or of equal right of all 
residents in all States in s 117. The true test must, 
as always, be the actual language used.90 
 
Once the break with the J.C.P.C. had been effected between 
 
89.  James v. Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1 (PC) (Austl.); see also 
Anthony Dillon, A Turtle by Any Other Name: The Legal Basis of the Australian 
Constitution, 29 FED. L. REV. 241 (2001) (describing the role of the United 
Kingdom Parliament and the JCPC. in the interpretation and amendment of 
the Australian Constitution prior to 1986). 
90.  See James, 55 CLR at 43–44 (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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1968 and 1986,91 the High Court rejected this approach in Black 
v. Commonwealth.92 There, the High Court affirmed that Section 
116 “is not, in form, a constitutional guarantee of the rights of 
individuals…. Section 116 . . . instead takes the form of express 
restriction upon the exercise of Commonwealth legislative 
power.”93  This merely served to confirm how the High Court had 
interpreted Section 116.  Applying a restrictive interpretation of 
the four guarantees greatly reduces the potential for it to provide 
a strong protection for free exercise. 
Aside from finding that this is a limitation on power and not 
a guarantee of individual rights, there is also the textual 
limitation of Section 116, that it is directed only at 
Commonwealth, and not State action.  Moreover, it must be 
noted that very little judicial attention has been given Section 
116 over the course of Australian federation; indeed, the second 
guarantee, prohibiting the imposition of religious observance, 
has never been judicially considered.  Of the remaining three 
guarantees, two, prohibiting establishment and a religious test 
for a Commonwealth office, have been considered in one case 
each.  In Black, the High Court found that Commonwealth 
financial support for state religiously affiliated schools did not 
establish a state religion, finding that: 
 
[E]stablishing a religion involves the 
entrenchment of a religion as a feature of and 
identified with the body politic, in this instance, 
the Commonwealth. It involves the identification 
of the religion with the civil authority so as to 
involve the citizen in a duty to maintain it and the 
obligation of, in this case, the Commonwealth to 
patronize, protect and promote the established 
religion. In other words, establishing a religion 
involves its adoption as an institution of the 
 
91.  In 1986, the Australian Parliament legislated, with reciprocal 
legislation enacted by the British Parliament, to sever the Australian courts 
from the United Kingdom: see Australia Act 1986 (Cth) (Austl.), and the 
Australia Act 1986 c. 2 (UK), abolished appeals from the High Court of 
Australia to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the U.K. 
92.  Black v. Commonwealth, (1981) 146 CLR 559, 605 (Austl.). 
93.  Id. at 605, 653. 
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Commonwealth, part of the Commonwealth 
“establishment.”94 
 
And, while asked to address the issue in Williams v. 
Commonwealth,95 the High Court refused to consider whether 
Commonwealth funding of school chaplains in state schools 
constituted the imposition of a religious test for a 
Commonwealth office. 
The greatest judicial attention has been given to the free 
exercise guarantee.  In three decisions—Krygger v. Williams,96 
Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v. Commonwealth,97 
and Kruger v. Commonwealth98—the High Court has effectively 
narrowed the scope of free exercise to a very small number of 
cases.  In Krygger (later affirmed by Jehovah’s Witnesses and 
Kruger), Griffith C.J. wrote that Section 116 protects against: 
 
Prohibiting the practice of religion—the doing of 
acts which are done in the practice of religion.  To 
require a man to do a thing which has nothing at 
all to do with religion is not prohibiting him from 
a free exercise of religion.  It may be that a law 
requiring a man to do an act which his religion 
forbids would be objectionable on moral grounds, 
but it does not come within the prohibition of sec 
116.99 
 
In other words, a legislative or executive act must have as 
its express purpose the infringement of free exercise so as to run 
afoul of Section 116.  The effect of such an act is not enough to 
violate the free exercise guarantee.  As such, the courts have 
rejected free exercise claims where: (i) compulsory peacetime 
military training offends the religious convictions of persons who 
 
94.  Id. at 582, 604, 612, 653. 
95.  Williams v. Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 (Austl.). 
96.  Krygger v. Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366 (Austl.). 
97.  Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. Commonwealth (1943) 67 
CLR 116 (Austl.). 
98.  Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
99.  Krygger, 15 CLR at 369. 
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believe that military service is opposed to the will of God;100 and 
(ii) the use of legislation for compulsory removal of Aboriginal 
children from their families prohibited them from access to and 
free exercise of their tribal religion.101 
In practice, then, Section 116, as judicially interpreted, 
while providing protection against the sorts of infringements 
covered by the four guarantees, fails to provide a comprehensive 
and robust protection for free exercise of religion.  Another 
guarantee, however, one judicially implied in the terms of the 
Australian Constitution, supplements the limited protections of 
Section 116.  Moreover, these interpretations, when read in 
conjunction with the Preamble’s words “humbly relying on the 
blessing of Almighty God,”102 support the view that the text of 
the Australian Constitution, interpreted by the High Court, 
establishes a secular federation, albeit one closer to the center of 
the Continuum of Constitutionalism in Figure 1, and to the 
Secular/Separation Zone of Oscillation in Figure 2.  
Commentators describe the outcome of this process of express 
and implied constitutional provision as establishing fruitful 
interaction and cooperation,103 more a “semi-permeable 
membrane”104 or “imaginary wall”105 than impenetrable barrier 
between church and state. 
 
2. Freedom of Political Communication 
 
Unlike the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall make no 
law. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,”106 the 
Australian Constitution contains no such express protection.  In 
 
100.  Id. 
101.  Kruger, 190 CLR at 1. 
102.  Australian Constitution pmbl. 
103.  TOM FRAME, CHURCH AND STATE: AUSTRALIA’S IMAGINARY WALL 7–9 
(Univ. of New S. Wales Press Ltd., Carla Taines ed. 2006). 
104.  PETER MACFARLANE & SIMON FISHER, CHURCHES, CLERGY AND THE 
LAW 32 (Fed’n Press 1996) (“metaphorically, the flow of Commonwealth 
largesse to religious institutions is permitted; what is blocked is the reverse 
passage of religious entanglement with Commonwealth affairs”) (citing Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)). 
105.  See generally FRAME, supra note 103. 
106.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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1977, however, Justice Lionel Murphy began foreshadowing the 
possible existence of a number of implied rights, such as political 
communication as captured in the First Amendment: 
 
Elections of federal Parliament provided for in the 
Constitution require freedom of movement, 
speech and other communication, not only 
between the States, but in and between every part 
of the Commonwealth. The proper operation of the 
system of representative government requires the 
same freedoms between elections. These are also 
necessary for the proper operation of the 
Constitutions of the States (which now derive 
their authority from Ch. V of the Constitution.  
From these provisions and from the concept of the 
Commonwealth arises an implication of a 
constitutional guarantee of such freedoms, 
freedoms so elementary that it was not necessary 
to mention them in the Constitution…). The 
freedoms are not absolute, but nearly so. They are 
subject to necessary regulation (for example, 
freedom of movement is subject to regulation for 
purposes of quarantine and criminal justice; 
freedom of electronic media is subject to 
regulation to the extent made necessary by 
physical limits upon the number of stations which 
can operate simultaneously). The freedoms may 
not be restricted by the Parliament or State 
Parliaments except for such compelling 
reasons.107 
 
Here we see the High Court working with the text of the 
Constitution as part of the structure established by the framers.  
Consider that: 
 
In his “Message to the Australian People” on the 
day of the Commonwealth’s Inauguration, 
 
107.  Ansett Transp. Indus. (Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth 
(1977) 139 CLR 54, 88 (Aust.) (citations omitted). 
29
ARTICLE 1_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/03/2019  7:54 PM 
30 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.1 
Edmund Barton, the freshly anointed first Prime 
Minister, described what he considered to be “the 
main principle of the Commonwealth” expressed 
in its Constitution: “Its representation in one 
House bespeaks justice to the individual; its 
representation in the other bespeaks equal justice 
to each State.  It will, and must be, the aim of the 
Government of the Commonwealth to give 
complete effect to both of these principles.”108 
 
Certainly, in referring to those “freedoms so elementary 
that it was not necessary to mention them in the 
Constitution,”109 Murphy J sought to give effect to this main 
principle, as enunciated by one of the framers and the first 
Prime Minister under the new Constitution.  Sadly, Murphy J 
would never live to see this vision of the Constitution and its 
elementary freedoms realized. 
In 1992, with Murphy having died in 1986, the High Court 
recognized the existence of an implied freedom of political 
communication in Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills110 and 
Austl. Cap. Television v. Commonwealth,111 which was later 
modified in Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp.112 and Coleman v. 
Power,113 and finally supplemented in 2013 by McCloy v. New S. 
Wales114 and Brown v. Tasmania.115  Together, these cases stand 
for the proposition “that there is to be discerned in the doctrine 
of representative government which the Constitution 
incorporates an implication of freedom of communication of 
 
108.  HELEN IRVING, TO CONSTITUTE A NATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
AUSTRALIA’S CONSTITUTION 169, 162–63 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) 
(citations omitted); see also W. HARRISON MOORE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 329 (1902). 
109.  Ansett Transp. Indus. (Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth 
(1977) 139 CLR 54, 88 (Aust.) (citations omitted). 
110.  Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
111.  Austl. Cap. Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 
106 (Austl.).   
112.  Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559–62 (Austl.) 
(explaining more in the Section entitled Freedom of Communication) (citations 
omitted). 
113.  Coleman v. Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
114.  McCloy v. New S. Wales (2015) HCA 34 (Austl.). 
115.  Brown v. Tasmania (2017) HCA 43 (Austl.). 
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information and opinions about matters relating to the 
government of the Commonwealth.”116  In expounding this 
implied freedom, unlike the limited application of Section 116 to 
Commonwealth legislative power alone, the High Court has held 
that it is logically indivisible in the sense that it applies to 
matters of both Commonwealth and State concern.117 
Two decisions of the High Court, both delivered in 2013, 
provide further clarification of the implied freedom, especially as 
it relates to religious freedom.  First, in McCloy v. New S. 
Wales,118 the majority wrote that: 
 
The freedom under the Australian Constitution is 
a qualified limitation on legislative power implied 
in order to ensure that the people of the 
Commonwealth may ‘exercise a free and informed 
choice as electors.’  It is not an absolute freedom.  
It may be subject to legislative restrictions serving 
a legitimate purpose compatible with the system 
of representative government for which 
the Constitution provides, where the extent of the 
burden can be justified as suitable, necessary and 
adequate, having regard to the purpose of those 
restrictions.119 
 
And in Att’y-Gen. (SA) v. Corp. of Adelaide, two members of 
the Court added that: 
 
Some ‘religious’ speech may also be characterised 
as ‘political’ communication for the purposes of 
the freedom. . . . Plainly enough, preaching, 
canvassing, haranguing and the distribution of 
literature are all activities which may be 
undertaken in order to communicate to members 
of the public matters which may be directly or 
 
116.  Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
117.  Austl. Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 
106 (Austl.).   
118.  McCloy, HCA 34, at [2]; see also Monis v. The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 
92 (Austl.). 
119.  McCloy, HCA 34, at [2]. 
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indirectly relevant to politics or government at the 
Commonwealth level. The class of communication 
protected by the implied freedom in practical 
terms is wide.120 
 
The ambit of the implied freedom of political communication 
appears, then, to expand so as to cover religious communication, 
whether the infringement is Commonwealth or State.  The High 
Court will provide further instruction as to the religious scope of 
this protection when it delivers its judgment in the twin appeals 
in Preston v. Avery121 and Clubb v. Edwards;122 both involve 
claims brought for infringement of political speech by peaceful 
religious activists who encroached upon abortion clinic safe 
access zones. 
No right, though, is absolute.  In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
Roberts J of the United States Supreme Court wrote that “in the 
nature of things . . . [free exercise of religion] cannot be 
[absolute].”123  In the Australian context, Latham argued that it 
must be “possible to reconcile religious freedom with ordered 
government.”124  And in McCloy v. New S. Wales,125 the High 
Court determined that, in assessing infringements of the 
implied freedom of political communication, a two-stage test 
applies: 
 
[Political communication] is not an absolute 
freedom. It may be subject to legislative 
restrictions serving a legitimate purpose 
compatible with the system of representative 
government for which the Constitution provides, 
where the extent of the burden can be justified as 
 
120.  Att’y-Gen. (SA) v. Corp. of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 43–44, 73–74 
(Austl.). 
121.  Preston v. Avery, appeal docketed, No. H2/2018 (HCA 2018) (Austl.).  
122.  Clubb v. Edwards, appeal docketed, No. M46/2018 (HCA 2018) 
(Austl.). 
123.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). 
124.  GEORGE WILLIAMS, SEAN BRENNAN & ANDREW LYNCH, AUSTL. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & THEORY: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 1175 (Fed’n Press 
6th ed. 2014) (citing Adelaide Co of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v. Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR. 116, 132 (Austl.)). 
125.  McCloy, HCA 34, at [2]. 
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suitable, necessary and adequate, having regard 
to the purpose of those restrictions.126 
 
In assessing the justifiability of limitations, the High Court 
in McCloy enunciated a three-question standard: 
 
The question whether a law exceeds the implied 
limitation depends upon the answers to the 
following questions. . .: 
1. Does the law effectively burden the freedom in 
its terms, operation or effect? If “no”, then the law 
does not exceed the implied limitation and the 
enquiry as to validity ends. 
2. If “yes” to question 1, are the purpose of the law 
and the means adopted to achieve that purpose 
legitimate, in the sense that they are compatible 
with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative government?  
This question reflects what is referred to in these 
reasons as “compatibility testing.” 
The answer to that question will be in the 
affirmative if the purpose of the law and the 
means adopted are identified and are compatible 
with the constitutionally prescribed system in the 
sense that they do not adversely impinge upon the 
functioning of the system of representative 
government. 
If the answer to question 2 is “no”, then the law 
exceeds the implied limitation and the enquiry as 
to validity ends. 
3. If “yes” to question 2, is the law reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to advance that 
legitimate object?  This question involves what is 
referred to in these reasons as “proportionality 
testing” to determine whether the restriction 
which the provision imposes on the freedom is 
justified.127 
 
126.  Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
127.  Id. 
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The proportionality test involves consideration of the extent 
of the burden effected by the impugned provision on the freedom.  
There are three stages to the test.  These are the enquiries as to 
whether the law is justified as suitable, necessary, and adequate 
in its balance in the following senses: 
 
suitable — as having a rational connection to the 
purpose of the provision; 
necessary — in the sense that there is no obvious 
and compelling alternative, reasonably 
practicable means of achieving the same purpose 
which has a less restrictive effect on the freedom; 
adequate in its balance — a criterion requiring a 
value judgment, consistently with the limits of the 
judicial function, describing the balance between 
the importance of the purpose served by the 
restrictive measure and the extent of the 
restriction it imposes on the freedom. 
If the measure does not meet these criteria of 
proportionality testing, then the answer to 
question 3 will be “no” and the measure will 
exceed the implied limitation on legislative 
power.128 
 
In sum, then, the Australian Constitution provides 
protection for the free exercise of individuals through the 
convergence of Section 116, albeit limited by restrictive 
interpretation of the High Court, and the implied freedom of 
political communication, notwithstanding that limitations may 
be placed upon that right.  Comprehensive protection, however, 
requires the addition of legislative protections, both 
Commonwealth and State. We turn next to those additions. 
 
C. Legislative Protections 
 
Two types of legislation supplement the protections found in 
 
128.  Id. (affirmed in Brown v. Tasmania (2017) HCA 43, at [123]–[131], 
and [236] (Austl.)). 
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the Australian Constitution: (1) bills of rights enacted by States 
or Territories, and (2) Commonwealth and State or Territory 
anti-discrimination legislation.  We consider each in turn. 
 
1. Bills of Rights 
 
Two Australian jurisdictions, the Australian Capital 
Territory and the State of Victoria, have enacted human rights 
legislation.  Some have referred to these enactments as 
legislative bills of rights: in the case of the former, the Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT), and in that of the latter, the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).  Both 
statutes protect free exercise; the Victorian provision is 
representative: 
 
14 Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and 
belief 
(1) Every person has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion and belief, 
including— 
(a) the freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his or her choice; and 
(b) the freedom to demonstrate his or her 
religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching, either individually 
or as part of a community, in public or in 
private. 
(2) A person must not be coerced or restrained 
in a way that limits his or her freedom to 
have or adopt a religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice or teaching.129 
 
Yet, while both statutes provide for the protection of 
individual rights, neither has received anything more than 
 
129.  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 14 
(Austl). 
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passing judicial attention.130  Significant protection, however, is 
found in State and Territory anti-discrimination legislation. 
 
2. Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
 
The final recourse for the protection of free exercise is found 
in Commonwealth and State and Territory anti-discrimination 
legislation.  An example of the former is found in the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)131 and of the latter in the Equal 
Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic).132 State and Territory anti-
discrimination legislation provides for prohibited grounds of 
discrimination; the Victorian legislation, for instance, provides 
in Section 6 that: 
 
The following are the attributes on the basis of 
which discrimination is prohibited in the areas of 
activity set out in Part 4— 
(a) age; 
(b) breastfeeding; 
(c) employment activity; 
(d) gender identity 
(e) disability; 
(f) industrial activity; 
(g) lawful sexual activity; 
(h) marital status; 
(i) parental status or status as a carer; 
 
130.  See NICHOLAS ARONEY, JOEL HARRISON & PAUL BABIE, Religious 
Freedom Under the Victorian Charter of Rights, in AUSTRALIAN CHARTERS OF 
RIGHTS A DECADE ON 120 (Matthew Groves & Colin Campbell eds., Fed’n Press 
2017). 
131.  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (Austl.). In addition to this, 
the Commonwealth has enacted the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) 
(Austl.), the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.), and the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) (Austl.). 
132.  Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic.) (Austl.). Every state and territory 
has enacted similar legislation. See Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) (Austl.); 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act 1996 
(NT) (Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (Austl.); Equal Opportunity 
Act 1984 (SA) (Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) (Austl.); Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) (Austl.). 
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(j) physical features; 
(k) political belief or activity; 
(l) pregnancy;  
(m) race; 
(n) religious belief or activity; 
(o) sex; 
(p) sexual orientation; 
    (pa) an expunged homosexual conviction; 
(q) personal association (whether as a relative or 
otherwise) with a person who is identified by 
reference to any of the above attributes.133 
 
Such legislation, however, also sets out exceptions to or 
exemptions from the prohibited grounds of discrimination for 
religious organizations.  Thus, the Victorian legislation provides, 
in Sections 82–84, that: 
 
82. (1) Nothing in Part 4 applies to— 
(a) the ordination or appointment of 
priests, ministers of religion or 
members of a religious order; or 
(b) the training or education of people 
seeking ordination or appointment as 
priests, ministers of religion or 
members of a religious order; or 
(c) the selection or appointment of people 
to perform functions in relation to, or 
otherwise participate in, any religious 
observance or practice. 
(2) Nothing in Part 4 applies to anything done 
on the basis of a person’s religious belief or activity, 
sex, sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, 
marital status, parental status or gender identity 
by a religious body that— 
(a) conforms with the doctrines, beliefs 
or principles of the religion; or 
(b) is reasonably necessary to avoid 
 
133.  Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 6 (Austl.). 
37
ARTICLE 1_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/03/2019  7:54 PM 
38 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.1 
injury to the religious sensitivities of 
adherents of the religion. 
83. (1) This section applies to a person or body, 
including a religious body, that establishes, 
directs, controls, administers or is an educational 
institution that is, or is to be, conducted in 
accordance with religious doctrines, beliefs or 
principles. 
84. Nothing in Part 4 applies to discrimination by 
a person against another person on the basis of 
that person’s religious belief or activity, sex, sexual 
orientation, lawful sexual activity, marital status, 
parental status or gender identity if the 
discrimination is reasonably necessary for the first 
person to comply with the doctrines, beliefs or 
principles of their religion.134 
 
While they afford some protection to individuals, these 
exemptions apply, though, largely to religious organizations or 
bodies.  The Victorian legislation, in Section 81, offers this 
definition of a religious body: “(a) a body established for a 
religious purpose; or (b) an entity that establishes, or directs, 
controls or administers, an educational or other charitable entity 
that is intended to be, and is, conducted in accordance with 
religious doctrines, beliefs or principles.”135 
While judicial consideration has produced variable results 
in terms of the meaning and application of the exemptions 
contained in anti-discrimination legislation,136 what emerges is 
a “centrality of non-discrimination or equality legislation and, 
further, equality principles, in determining law and religion 
claims.’137  It is clear that these exemptions, when taken together 
with the guarantees afforded by the Australian Constitution and 
the legislative bills of rights, achieve a comprehensive protection 
for free exercise in Australia. 
 
134.  Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) ss 82–84 (Austl.). 
135.  Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 81 (Austl.). 
136.  See, e.g., Christian Youth Camps Ltd. v. Cobaw Cmty. Health Servs. 
Ltd. (2014) VSCA 75 (Austl.); OV v. Members of Wesley Mission Council (2010) 
79 NSWLR 606 (Austl.).  
137.  ARONEY, HARRISON, & BABIE, supra note 130, at 127. 
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Conclusion: Comparative Reflections 
 
 India and Australia, both secular constitutional federal 
democracies which have emerged from the former British 
Empire as members of the Commonwealth of Nations, fall 
within the Secular/Separation zone on the Continuum of 
Constitutionalism identified in Figures 1 and 2.  And both 
achieve a comprehensiveness in their protection of religious free 
exercise or liberty.  Where, precisely, they fall at that end of the 
continuum, however, is not clear; nor need it be.  As explained 
in the Introduction, most, if not all, nations will not be amenable 
to such precision in placing.  Rather, they will move between, or 
oscillate, within zones of the continuum.  This is certainly true 
of India and Australia.  In both cases, one finds varying degrees 
of active elimination of religion from the public square, assertive 
secularism, secularism as neutrality, and soft formal separation.  
Both, then, demonstrate the ways in which a nation may 
oscillate around zones rather than find a fixed placement along 
the continuum.  As former British colonies, they both pursued 
this movement towards secularism as a consequence of that 
former colonial status.  Still, and perhaps more importantly, 
both nations demonstrate that it is possible to achieve a broadly  
similar outcome—Secularism/Separation—in very different 
ways. 
Indian Secularism/Separation seems to emerge as a 
necessity for the guarantee of peace in a multi-faith and multi-
ethnic nation.  India pursued this course through appeal to the 
British constitutional system as one which would guarantee the 
rule of law as the inspiration for the constitutional primacy of 
state secularism.  India achieves comprehensive protection for 
free exercise entirely within the constitutional framework found 
in articles 25–28 of its Constitution.  And while judicial 
interpretation of those provisions establishes the ambit of the 
right protected, and the limitations which might be placed upon 
it in practice, the result is clear: religious free exercise, although 
operating within a milieu of secularism, is provided ample 
protection.  This limitation and protection of the rights to 
religion is not static.  Rather, it is continuously being tested with 
reference to the touchstone of equality working in conjunction 
with other rights and principles enshrined in the Indian 
39
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Constitution.  To ensure against discrimination, any religious 
practice seeking protection may be subject to limitations so as to 
protect the competing right.  Thus, secularism as a principle and 
secularity as a constitutional value are intended to work 
together to achieve justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity as set 
out in the preamble to the Indian Constitution. 
Paradoxically, notwithstanding the common historical, 
legal, and constitutional roots, Australian 
Secularism/Separation was both an idealistic choice on the basis 
of the prevailing constitutional philosophies at the time of 
federation and perhaps a necessity to protect the rights of 
minority groups who might have been harmed by an official 
state church of Australia.  Unlike India, though, rather than 
following the British constitutional model, Australia looked to 
the United States as the precedent for achieving separation and 
the protection of religious freedom.  Thus, while clearly a secular 
state, Australia achieves a comprehensive protection for free 
exercise through a combination of constitutional and legislative 
provisions.  The protection begins with the four guarantees 
found in Section 116 which, while restrictively interpreted by 
the High Court, nonetheless achieve some protection in the form 
of preventing the establishment of a state religion, thereby 
preserving a fragile separation of church and state, and 
protection at least against Commonwealth action which, in its 
express purpose, requires any religious observance, or 
limitations upon any such observance, or religious tests for 
Commonwealth office.  When read in conjunction with the 
implied protection for political communication, it is possible to 
conclude that the Australian Constitution provides for 
moderately robust protection for free exercise.  And to this must 
be added the legislative protections found in Commonwealth, 
State and Territory legislation either to protect free exercise—
as found in legislative bills of rights—or the exemptions for 
individuals or organizations for religious reasons from the 
equality provisions of anti-discrimination legislation. 
In short, while India provides protection for free exercise in 
a comprehensive constitutional framework, and Australia 
achieves that result through a piecemeal and ad hoc collection of 
constitutional and legislative provisions, both achieve the same 
result: comprehensive protection for religious free exercise.  
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Thus, both nations can be plotted somewhere in the 
secular/separation zone of the Continuum of Constitutionalism.  
And both demonstrate different methods of protecting free 
exercise of religion as the keystone right that, in its cumulative 
effect, establishes the constitutional space for the protection of 
the full matrix of human rights protection. 
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